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APPEALABILITY OF 1404(a) ORDERS: MANDAMUS
MISAPPLIED
By allowing actions to be transferred to a more convenient forum, section
1404(a) of the United States Judicial Code gives courts power to decide the
place of trial when proper venue exists in more than one district.' Prior to
the enactment of section 1404(a), federal venue law alterations repeatedly
shifted practical control over choice of forum between plaintiffs and defendants.
2
Free exercise of this power was curtailed, however, by courts recognizing the
fundamental importance of place of trial and the inevitable abuse of rules giving
the choice to either party. The doctrine of forum non conveniens was invoked
to dismiss actions brought in an inconvenient forum.3 But judicial application
of forum non conveniens did not afford complete protection to the parties.
1. "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952).
2. The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave plaintiffs free rein in choosing the place of trial:
suit was proper wherever the defendant could be found. Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20, § 11,
1 STAT. 78. This wide choice was later narrowed. Where federal jurisdiction was based
solely on diversity, venue existed only in the districts of plaintiffs' or defendants' residence.
In all other cases, the selection was made by Congress, plaintiffs being limited to defend-
ants' residence. Act of Aug. 13, 1888, c. 866, § 1, 25 STAT. 434. Under this act, corporate
defendants able to choose their legal residence through incorporation achieved considerable
power over venue. See Note, 49 YALE L.J. 724-29 (1940). To meet this problem, sub-
sequent legislation giving private parties rights against corporations often included pro-
visions allowing plaintiffs a greater choice of venue. E.g., Federal Employers' Liability
Act, 36 STAT. 291 (1910), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1952), amending 34 STAT. 232
(1906) ("district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose,
or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action") ;
Clayton Act, § 5, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952) ("district in which the defend-
ant resides or is found or has an agent") ; 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (1952), amending 49 STAT.
1213 (1936) (stockholders' derivative suits: any district in which corporation could sue
co-defendants). See United States v. National City Lines, 337 U.S. 78, 85 (1949) (col-
lecting statutes with special venue provisions). More recently, a Supreme Court decision
made corporations amenable to suit in the federal courts in any state in which they had
appointed agents for service of process under state law. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuild-
ing Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939) (venue objections under these circumstances held waived) ;
Comment, The Aftermath of the Neirbo Case, 42 ILL. L. REv. 780 (1948). Neirbo was
codified and expanded in the 1948 Judicial Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1952). See Bar-
rett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions for Reform, 7
VAND. L. REv. 608, 609-12 (1954). For an account of the development of venue require-
ments at common law, displaying the same basic conflict between the parties, see Ehrenz-
weig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Foron
Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 301 (1956).
3. Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947) ; Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) ; see Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forem,
60 HA~v. L. REv. 908, 918-30 (1947) ; cf. Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws,
22 U. Cm. L. REv. 405, 416-38 (1955).
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Courts restricted the doctrine's application to extreme cases in limited areas,
and dismissed plaintiffs often could not obtain a hearing in another forum.4
Section 1404(a) avoided tliese problems 5 but gave rise to new questions.6 In
removing the hardship of dismissal, authorization of transfer also eliminated
4. The plaintiff's choice of venue was not disturbed except in cases where extreme
inconvenience to defendants was clearly shown. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra note 3, at
508. And actions brought under special venue statutes were excluded. United States v.
National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573 (1.948) (Sherman Act); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner,
314 U.S. 44 (1941) (FEJA). But see Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas.
Co., supra note 3 (forum non conveniens does apply to stockholders' derivative suits).
Plaintiff, if economically able, was of course free to pursue his action in the convenient
forum, or any other proper forum in which he could serve defendant, provided that the
statute of limitations had not run and, if necessary, he could find property of the defendant
to attach. See, e.g., Gore v. United States Steel Corp., 15 N.J. 301, 313-14, 104 A.2d 670,
677 (1954) (statute of limitations).
5. The substitution of transfer for dismissal mitigates the effect on plaintiff of a success-
ful plea of inconvenient forum by defendant. The defendant is already before the court
and need not be served again. Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777, 779-80 (9th
Cir. 1950). The pleadings and other pre-trial procedures already completed need not be
repeated. Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1950). And the statute of limitations tolls from the time the original action was brought.
Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 947 (1950). Moreover the plaintiff himself, in a proper case, may seek a transfer.
Dufek v. Roux Distributing Co., 125 F. Stipp. 716, 717-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). But the plain-
tiff is not the only party who may derive benefit from these changes. The lessened severity
of the remedy has led to its increased availability. Thus the Supreme Court has held that
the "judicial gloss" giving actions brought under statutes with special venue provisions
immunity from forum non conveniens dismissal does not apply to 1404(a). United States
v. National City Lines, 337 U.S. 78 (1949) (Sherman Act) ; Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S.
55 (1949) (FELA). And although no exact standards to guide the district courts in apply-
ing 1404(a) have been established, the strict standards of forum non conveniens have been
held no longer controlling. Norvood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955); see Kaufman,
Further Observations on Transfers under Section 1404(a), 56 COLUM. L. REy. 1, 1.1-12
(1956) (hereinafter cited as Kaufman, Further Observations).
6. For example, whether the law of the transferee or transferor forum applies is cur-
rently unclear. See Curry v. States Marine Corp., 118 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). If
the transferee district's law applies and the statute of limitations embraces a shorter period,
a transfer may have the effect of old forum non conveniens dismissal. See Headrick v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 182 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Kaufman, Observations on Trans-
fers under Section 1404(a) of the New Judicial Code, 10 F.R.D. 595, 600-01 (1951). A
related question is the extent to which 1404(a) will be used to prevent shopping for a
sympathetic forum. See Clayton v. Warlick, 232 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1956) (law of trans-
feror circuit more favorable to plaintiff) ; Currie, supra note 3. See also Torres v. Walsh,
221 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955) (judgments in transferor
district larger than in transferee district) ; Gibson, The Venue Clause and Transportation
of Lawsuits, 18 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 367 (1953). Equally far reaching is the practice,
followed by some courts and rejected by others, of allowing plaintiffs to circumvent
personal service requirements by transferring, over defendants' objection, to a district in
which service would have been impossible, notwithstanding the existence of proper venue.
Compare Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950), with Dufek v.
Rou: Distributing Co., 125 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the basis of appeal under forum non conveniens.7 And neither the legislative
history nor section 1404(a) itself indicates whether Congress, while realizing
the importance of a convenient forum to both parties, intended to allow or
deny immediate review of transfer orders.
8
Review of 1404(a) orders at the conclusion of an action does not adequate-
ly protect litigants. If a party can afford the increased expense caused by an
erroneous transfer order, ultimate appeal offers him no opportunity to recoup.9
If such expense makes prosecution or defense of an action economically
unfeasible, the resulting default or dismissal bars a hearing on the merits.10
Moreover, a party whose case has been prejudiced by his inability to require
the personal appearance of a witness because of a 1404(a) order generally
cannot show harmful error. 1
7. Only the plaintiff could appeal under forum non conveniens. Dismissal furnished
the ground for such appeal. Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360,
362 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 947 (1950) ; Braucher, supra note 3, at 937-38.
8. Section 1404(a) was introduced as part of a full-scale revision of the Judicial Code;
accordingly, its legislative history is meager, consisting mainly of the Revisor's Note which
makes no reference to appeal. It has, therefore, been argued that since evidence of intent
to eliminate plaintiffs' forum non conveniens appeal is lacking, orders granting transfer
should be reviewable. Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 866,
870 (2d Cir. 1950) (dissenting opinion). It might as easily be argued that no intention is
shown to institute review where the motion is denied, and that, absent dismissal, no dis-
tinction between orders granting and denying transfer should be made.
Review will be used in this Note to refer to appellate consideration of a decision, by
whatever means achieved, while appeal will be restricted to that review which a party may
obtain as a matter of right.
9. For example, a patent suit is brought in state A, where an allegedly infringing
article was sold. Defendant has its offices and laboratories in state B, plaintiff in state C.
Defendant's motion to transfer to either state B or state C, both on the west coast, from
state A, on the east coast, is denied. The only issue in the action is highly technical, and
defendant estimates that the cost of presenting its evidence in state A, taking into account
disruptions in its operations caused by the absence of key personnel, will be $50,000 more
than in state B or C. Although defendant wins a verdict, he cannot recover the additional
$50,000 expense. See Aircraft Marine Products, Inc. v. Burndy Engineering Co., 96 F.
Stipp. 588, 591-92 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
10. Thus, plaintiff, a citizen of state A, while traveling with a friend in state B,
visits defendant's store and is injured by defendant's negligence. Defendant's motion to
transfer the resulting suit from state A to state B is granted, since defendant has more
witnesses, and its expenses for transporting witnesses would be greater than plaintiff's.
Plaintiff cannot afford to go to state B for trial, or to pay the expenses of her only wit-
ness, the friend who was with her when the accideit happened. The suit is subsequently
dismissed for want of prosecution. No appeal is available to the plaintiff. See Nicol v.
Koscinski, 188 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1951); General Portland Cement Co. v. Perry, 204
F.2d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1953).
11. See, e.g., Reade Shirts, Inc. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.
N.Y. 1952) (plaintiff's key witness in suit on fire insurance policy refused to enter trans-
feree district).
The deposition of a witness beyond the reach of process is admissible as satisfactory
evidence of the facts to be proved. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d) (3) ; 5 WIGMORe, EVIDENCE
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Recognizing that immediate review would eliminate these difficulties but
finding no basis for appeal as of right, many courts have resorted to the
extraordinary writ of mandamus. 12 Appellate courts are authorized to use
mandamus only "in aid of their ... jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages
and principles of law. '13 Courts employing the writ have generally justified
its application "in aid of their jurisdictions" as the only means of preventing
frustration of their power to review 1404(a) orders, or "in accordance with
the usages and principles of law" as a method of correcting erroneous refusals
to exercise jurisdiction or abuses of discretion. 14 However, if 1404(a) orders
as a class can be brought within the mandamus power,' 5 so can many other
§§ 1395-96, 1401, 1404 (1940). To sustain his appeal in the situation depicted in text, appel-
lant would presumably have to convince the court that he was prejudiced by losing the
marginal benefit of personal testimony, and overcome the effect of similar arguments by
his opponent that cross-examination at the trial would have neutralized whatever margin
the court could divine.
12. The cases are collected in 6 MooRa, FED muL PRAcrcE f1 54.10[4], at 96-99 (1953)
(hereinafter cited as MooRE) ; Kaufman, Further Observations, 1-11; Comment, Review
of Section 1404(a) Federal Venue Proceedings by Extraordinary Writ, 43 CAuI. L. R .
841 (1955).
13. "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) (1952).
14. E.g., Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Igoe, 212 F.2d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 1954) (pro-
tecting jurisdiction to control lower courts); Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Rodney, 186
F.2d 111, 116 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953 (1951) (compelling exercise of
discretion by district court) ; Chicago, RI. & Pac. R.R. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299, 304 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 822 (1955) (abuse of discretion); Kaufman, Further Obser-
vations, 1-8.
Other justifications have been advanced. Thus the First Circuit, which is extremely
hostile to review of 1404(a) orders, has based its power to issue the writ on transfer out
of the circuit and hence out of its territorial jurisdiction. In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174
(1st Cir. 1954). Judge Frank of the Second Circuit, on the other hand, indicated that he
would issue the writ whenever necessary to further justice. Magnetic Engineering & Mfg.
Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 866, 870-71 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1950) (dissenting opinion).
The background of mandamus is sufficiently uncertain to support either of these positions.
See Notes, 63 YALE L.J. 105 (1953), 50 COLUm. L. REv. 1102 (1950). However, it is
difficult to support use of mandamus when transfer is ordered to a district where venue is
improper. For improper venue, if properly raised and preserved, is reversible error on
appeal. Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308, 316 (1919). Yet this very fact has been used to
justify issuance of mandamus to prevent a trial that would, in the light of the fatal defect
of venue, be useless. Indeed, this use of mandamus is the most common. Arrowhead Co.
v. The Aimee Lykes, 193 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1951); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight,
181. F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950); Kaufman, Further Observations, 1-2. Compare Bankers
Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382 (1953) ; Gulf Research & Development Co.
v. Leahy, 193 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1951), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 344 U.S. 861
(1952) (rejecting mandamus in non-1404(a) context where reversible venue error existed).
See also note 23 infra.
15. The difference between those who consider mandamus the proper means of review-
ing any 1404(a) order and those who would use the writ only where the individual case
was extraordinary, regardless of the type of order, is illustrated by the opinions of the
Second Circuit. Thus, in Arrowhead Co. v. The Aimee Lykes, supra note 14; Anthony v.
Kaufman, 193 F.2d 85, 86 (2d Cir. 1951.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 955 (1952) ; Ford Motor
1957]
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classes of orders now denied immediate review. 16 Other courts, opposed to
judicial conversion of mandamus into a discretionary interlocutory appeal, have
denied the writ in 1404(a) cases ;17 and the Supreme Court has not resolved
the conflict.' 8
Although review of 1404(a) orders by mandamus does threaten the policy
barring interlocutory appeals, immediate review by other means would not con-
Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851 (1950); and Magnetic
Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., supra -note 14, mandamus was said to be the
proper remedy, although no arguments were presented to show that the particular case
was extraordinary. In these opinions, all by Judge Learned Hand or Judge Frank, the
nature of 1404 (a) orders as a class rather than the character of the particular case justified
consideration of the writ. But in Torres v. Walsh, 221 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 836 (1955), Judge Medina employed an entirely different approach. While agree-
ing that mandamus will always lie to keep the district court to its jurisdiction, he confined
consideration of mandamus to correct discretion to cases established as extraordinary. It
has been argued that Torres, concerning ordinary tort and contract claims, can be recon-
ciled with the cases such as Ryan, involving large business enterprises, on the ground that
large scale business litigation is in itself extraordinary enough to warrant interlocutory
review, while small tort or contract claims are too trifling to deserve immediate attention
of the appellate courts. Kaufman, Further Observations, 3-4. Adoption of this rationale
would require reintroduction of the concept of jurisdictional amount into court of appeals
procedure. In any event, a subsequent decision by Judge Hand demonstrates that the dif-
ferent approaches stem from a basic difference of opinion. In dismissing the appeal from
a 1404(a) order in Littman v. Bache & Co., 246 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1957), and inviting
appellant to seek relief by mandamus, he mentioned no facts that transformed this ordinary
contract diversity action into an extraordinary case.
16. Orders denying summary judgments, for example, are not appealable. Jones v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 109 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1939). Nor has any case been
found using mandamus to review such a decision. Yet to be effective in protecting a party
entitled to judgment from the expense of an unnecessary trial, just as in controlling a lower
court, review must be immediate. Cf. Woods v. Robb, 171 F.2d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 1948).
Furthermore, a district court with power under a correct view of the law to grant sum-
mary judgment, which, because of an error in understanding its authority, denied the
motion, arguably has refused to exercise its jurisdiction. See Cohen v. Eleven W. 42nd
Street, Inc., 115 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1940). Again, the element of discretion in denial of
summary judgment motions facilitates utilization of an abuse of discretion rationale. See
6 MooRE ff 56.15[6]. Moreover, when the substantive law is misconstrued by a district
court, immediate review would clearly avoid a possibly expensive trial, although here the
error could be corrected on appeal. While the courts of appeals might well decline to
review such orders in the exercise of their discretion, the existence of relevant 1404(a)
authority, coupled with occasional success, would provide a strong incentive to litigants
desiring review or delay, and thereby subject the courts to the considerable burden of
weeding out mandamus petitions. See note 31 infra and accompanying text.
17. E.g., Great No. Ry. v. Hyde, 238 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1956) ; Clayton v. Warlick,
232 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1956) ; In re Josephson, 218 F,2d 174 (1st Cir. 1954).
Although mandamus has, in a sense, always been a means of discretionary interlocutory
review, it is limited to extraordinary cases and is not available merely because courts of
appeals desire to protect litigants or to clarify the law. Compare Roche v. Evaporated
Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943), with Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal,
41 YALE L.J. 539, 564-65 (1932).
18. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1.955) (no abuse of discretion; mandamus
issue not reached) ; United States v. National City Lines, 337 U.S. 78 (1949) (no error
below; mandamus issue not reached) ; Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949) (same).
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tradict that policy and would, in fact, be consistent with recent Supreme Court
decisions allowing appeal in closely analogous situations. The rule granting
appeals only from final orders has been justified as protecting appellate courts
and appellees from fragmentary and unnecessary appeals.19 Thus, in the line of
cases stemming from Cohen v. Benwficial Industrial Loan Corp., the Supreme
Court has held that orders will be regarded as final when they finally dispose of a
substantial claimed right which is not an element of the cause of action and is so
independent of it that joint review is neither necessary nor appropriate.
2 0
19. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-26 (1940) ; 6 MooRs i[ 54.11. See
Crick, supra note 17.
Appeals have been allowed from orders determining title and giving the right to im-
mediate possession before the end of the action. Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.)
201 (1848) ; 6 MooRn If 54.13. And, in multi-party litigation, orders disposing of all the
claims of one or more parties, where these claims were independent of those of the remain-
ing parties have been held appealable. United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co.,
269 U.S. 411, 413-14 (1926) ; see FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) ; 6 MooRE ff 54.15.
20. 337 U.S. 541 (1949) ; 6 Moore ff 54.14. Defendant's motion to force plaintiff in
a stockholder's derivative suit to post a bond demanded by state law had been denied on
the ground that the bond xwas a procedural requirement and that general rather than local
law applied. The Supreme Court, reversing on the substantive question, first held the order
to be final and appealable. It noted, however, that had the application of New Jersey law
been conceded, the controversy then concerning the amount of the bond, requisite finality
would have been lacking, since the court by statute retained power to adjust the security
during the proceedings. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547
(1949). A ruling requiring a bond would not have met the Cohen test, since the injury
to plaintiff would not have been serious, and he would have the power, by refusing to
comply and taking a dismissal, to make the order final. Compare Cohen v. Beneficial In-
dustrial Loan Corp., supra, with Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117 (1906) (order
to produce papers before master not final), and Cushing v. Laird, 107 U.S. 69, 77 (1882)
(order that garnishees pay fund into court not final while disposition of fund is still in
issue).
In thus limiting the scope of his holding, Justice Jackson used language which might
be construed as excluding orders involving discretion: "If the right were admitted or clear
and the order involved only an exercise of discretion as to the amount of security, a matter
the statute makes subject to reconsideration from time to time, appealability would present
a different question." Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., supra at 547. The com-
plete irrelevance of discretion to the considerations of judicial efficiency and protection of
litigants with which the Court was concerned, coupled with the fact that discretion is nor-
mally reviewable, see note 24 infra, indicates that continuing discretion was the subject of
the language. Swift & Co. v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950),
appeared to settle the question conclusively. The Supreme Court there held an order de-
clining jurisdiction over one of two defendants and vacating an attachment, but not ending
the action, to be final and appealable, despite a ruling by the circuit court that the order
was discretionary. Swift & Co. v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 175 F.2d 513, 517
(5th Cir. 1949). After ruling on appealability, the Supreme Court held that a court's dis-
cretionary power to decline jurisdiction to protect itself from impositions could not in this
case sustain the district judge's order. 339 U.S. at 688-89. Assuming without deciding
that forum non conveniens, the other possible discretionary basis for the appealed order,
applied to this type of case, the Court held that the district judge could not be sustained
since he had not based his discretion on the proper factors, and that even if the considera-
tion below had been so based, the order, on the facts of the case, still could not be sustained.
Id. at 697-98. The discretion issue has returned. Compare the dictum in the majority opinion
(order refusing to reduce allegedly excessive bail final and appealable "as there is no dis-
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1404(a) orders meet all these tests. While such orders may be reopened,
they are no more subject to continuous revision than the order in Cohncz
itself. The questions presented by 1404(a) motions concern convenience, the
propriety of the proposed forum and the legal scope of the section.21 As such,
they are rarely related to issues in the main cause of action.2 2 The difference
between 1404(a) questions and the other issues in the action, by giving rise to
different records, renders joint review unnecessary; and the difficulty of show-
ing prejudice after trial usually makes such review impossible.2 3 Furthermore,
as demonstrated by judicial reliance on mandamus, the right claimed under
section 1404 (a) is substantial.24 An erroneous order not only results in the in-
creased expense and inconvenience that 1404(a) was designed to prevent, it
may even change the outcome of the action. Nevertheless, the circuit courts
cretion to refuse to reduce excessive bail"), with the separate opinion of Justice Jackson
(order appealable even though discretion is involved), in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6-7,
12-13 (1951). The Supreme Court has also used the Cohen definition to hold final an
order denying an appeal in forma pauperis. Roberts v. United States Dist. Ct., 339 U.S.
844 (1950).
For collections of the types of orders appealable under Cohen, see 6 Mooan f 54.14;
Underwood, Appeals in the Federal Practice from Collateral Orders, 36 VA. L. REv. 731-
36 (1950). Significantly, the collected decisions were not limited to allowing appeal in the
particular case at hand but made entire classes of orders appealable.
21. See, e.g., Nicol v. Koscinsld, 188 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1951) (balancing of con-
veniences) ; In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1954) (propriety of proposed trans-
feree forum) ; Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Igoe, 212 F.2d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 822 (1955) (1404(a) applies to cases removed from state courts).
22. Cases where the issue raised by the transfer order is directly connected with the
principal cause of action would not be appealable. Thus Cohen would not apply to a denial
of a transfer motion based on a prediction that the testimony of the witness for whose
convenience transfer was sought would be excluded as irrelevant at trial. Cf. Libby,
McNeill & Libby v. Bristol City Line, 41 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (holding contract
not rescinded essential to determination under forum non conveniens). See text at note
20 supra.
This requirement would also bar extension of the Cohen definition to cover other classes
of orders, such as denials of summary judgments, where the interlocutory question was
closely related to the issues in the main cause of action. See note 16 snpra.
23. See notes 9-11 supra.
An order which transferred the action to a district where venue was improper would
not be subject to immediate review, since a defect of venue, if not waived, is fatal, and thus
review of the transfer order together with the final judgment would be appropriate. See
note 14 supra. And where the transferring court, in its order, specified which state's law
would apply, no appeal would lie against this part of the order, since prejudice arising
from such an error could easily be shown in the ultimate appeal. Cf. Currie, supra note 3.
It may be argued that 1404(a) orders should not be appealable in any case where
judgment for the appellant would moot the question. But under this criterion, the order
in Cohen itself would not have been appealable since judgment for plaintiff would have
mooted the security question. See note 20 supra.
24. While substantial is obviously a word of variable content, the decisions do give
some guidance. Compare Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (refusal to reduce excessive
bail appealable), with Assets Collecting Co. v. Barnes-King Development Co., 209 Fed.
206 (2d Cir. 1913) (order increasing security required of plaintiff not appealable). See
also 6 MooRE f 54.14, at 139-40 & n.25.
The argument might be made that since the disposition of a transfer motion is within
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have refused to allow immediate appeal; and the Supreme Court, in its de-
cisions on 1404(a), has avoided the question of review, leaving the conflict
with Cohen unresolved.
25
Although courts have buttressed their refusal to allow immediate appeal with
arguments that granting review as of right fosters delay and encourages frivo-
lous appeals, 26 review by mandamus is equally subject to these criticisms.2 7
the discretion of the district court, no "right" to a particular forum exists. But a district
judge whose decision is based on an error in interpreting the statute or on an abuse! of
discretion will be reversed when means of reviewing the decision can be found. See cases
cited note 14 supra; Kaufman, Further Observations, 1-2, 11. And appellate courts may
review the discretion of lower courts on appeal as well as by extraordinary writs. Thus,
while injunctions are within the discretion of the district court, Petroleum Exploration,
Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 218 (1938), an immediate interlocutory appeal
is given from any order granting or denying an injunction, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1952).
Similarly, though mandamus is within the discretion of the issuing court, this discretion is
subject to review. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 584-85 (1943) (dictum).
25. Littman v. Bache & Co., 246 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1957) (holding 1404(a) orders
unappealable and collecting cases) ; Kaufman, Further Observations, 1 & n.3 (collecting
cases).
None of the Suprene Court decisions have involved review of the dismissal of an appeal.
See note 18 supra.
26. All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1012 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Clinton
Foods, Inc. v. United States, 188 F.2d 289, 291-92 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1951) ; see note 25 smpra.
27. Mandamus is generally treated as a motion before the circuit court and therefore
is immune from the possible delays of the thirty day period for filing appeals, FED. R. Civ.
P. 73(a), and the forty day period for docketing appeals, FED. R. Crv. P. 73(g), 75(j).
The writ may also be considered out of turn. See, e.g., 3D CIM. RULE 19; 4TE CIR. RuLE
31. Nevertheless, as shown by the table below, petitions for mandamus in fact are not
necessarily reached sooner than appeals.
Average time (in months) required to dispose! of petitions for mandamus to
review 1404(a) orders where no appeal was concurrently filed, and median
time (in months) from notice of appeal to disposition of cases during fiscal
year ending June 30, 1955:
Circuit Number of Average time Median time
miandamius on mandamus on appeal
cases
D.C. 1 3.3 10.5
1st 1 6.3 6.4
2d 2 1.7 8.0
3d 2 6.3 6.3
4th 1 5.9 4.8
5th 1 0.7 10.0
6th 3 0.3 1.1.8
7th 5 5.6 8.2
8th 1 2.1 7.9
9th none
10th none
Mandamus figures based on letters from the Clerks of the United States Courts of Appeals
to the Yale Law Journal, on file in Yale Law Library. Appeal figures derived from Dim.
ADmIN. OFF. U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 159 (1955).
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For example, just as appeal entails stay of the appealed order,28 a stay is in-
variably granted when courts employ mandamus to review 1404(a) rulings.2 9
Similarly, the discretionary use of mandamus need not result in practical re-
view of a lesser number of cases than would appeal granted as of right. Once
a court accepts mandamus as the ordinary mode of review for 1404(a) rulings,
it must examine the merits of each petition to determine if the writ will issue.
Further, since the primary reason for review in these cases is to protect in-
dividual litigants rather than to settle issues of law,30 correction of error can-
not be postponed to a more convenient time as in review by certiorari. 3' Nor
are 1404(a) orders the type of ruling in which determination of the possibility
of error can be removed from the actual discovery of error.3 2 And the scope
of review on appeal need not be any different from that on mandamus. 33 Thus
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 62(a), 73(d) (automatic stay for ten days; stay pending appeal
on filing supersedeas bond). No such provision exists for a stay upon filing of petition for
mandamus.
The rules provide thirty days for filing a notice of appeal. Id. at 73(a). But if appeal of
1404(a) orders were allowed, delay in filing an appeal from an order granting a transfer
beyond the automatic stay of ten days might be unwise since once the papers had been
transferred, the appeal could be barred. See Magnetic Engineering & ,Mfg. Co. v. Dings
Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 866, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1950).
29. See, e.g., Littman v. Bache & Co., 246 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1957) (stay continued
by court of appeals to allow filing of petition for mandamus) ; Magnetic Engineering &
Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., supra note 28, at 867-68 (appeal treated as petition for man-
damus to avoid effect of papers having been transferred). In many cases the papers are
retained pending mandamus even though a formal stay is not granted. Int re Josephson,
218 F.2d 174, 177 (1st Cir. 1954); HART & WEcHSLER, THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE
FEDER Sysrm 981 n.8 (1953).
30. See note 14 supra. But see Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1955)
(dissenting opinion; importance of settling law).
31. The Supreme Court will deny certiorari on the ground that the issues presented
are of interest only to the parties and not to the public, Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70, 74 (1955), or because the public issue is not propitiously
presented by the particular case, Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912,
918 (1950) (dictum). While this policy may be justified by considerations of efficiency,
the same considerations do not apply to the courts of appeals where no previous review
has occurred, where added business can be countered with added judges and where the
statutory basis for certiorari does not exist. Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 1255 (1), 1256,
1257(3) (1952), with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-93 (1952). See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTElm 1402, 1404-05 (1953).
32. When, however, the lack of merit in the challenge to the transfer order is obvious,
the matter can be handled as expeditiously on a motion to dismiss an appeal as by man-
damus. Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360, 362-63 (4th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 947 (1950); MoMillan v. Taylor, 160 F.2d 217, 219 (D.C.
Cir. 1946) (dismissing appeal); lsT. Cm RULE 26(3); 2 D Cm. RULE 11(d); 4TH CIR.
RULE 9(3); 6TH CiR. RULE 15(3); 7TH CIm. RULE 12(g); 10rH CIR. RULE 14(4) (all
providing speedier procedures for appeals to be heard on motion to dismiss).
33. Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., supra note 32, at 362-63. The
standard most likely to result in reasonable appellate policy on 1404(a) orders would be
to treat determinations of convenience vel non as findings of fact, reversible only if clearly
erroneous, FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ; assessments of relative conveniences and the interests
of justice as questions within the discretion of the district judge, reversible only for abuse,
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knowing that consideration of the merits will result, litigants are unlikely to
be deterred from seeking relief by the necessity of filing a petition rather than
a notice of appeal.
3 4
Whether immediate review is desirable would therefore seem to be the real
issue. Review of any ruling may postpone ultimate disposition. Properly ad-
ministered, review of 1404(a) orders would present few possibilities of delay.3 5
Transfer motions normally are made at a very early stage of a proceeding. 6
see Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
821 (1954) ; and decisions on the legal scope of 1404(a) and related problems as conclu-
sions of law, reversible for error, cf. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip-
ment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950). These standards are equally possible under appeal and
mandamus.
34. While the use of a discretionary writ allows a court to discourage litigants from
seeking review, discretion does not guarantee this result. The essential element is a policy
of debying review without considering the merits. Compare In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174,
183 (1st Cir. 1954) (only First Circuit case where review of 1404(a) order was attempted),
with Second Circuit cases cited note 15 supra. But if the stakes are high enough, even a
stringent policy of selecting cases for review will not prevent the filing of unwarranted
petitions. Thus, despite the rigorous standards of the Supreme Court in dealing with
certiorari and even though review on the merits was granted in less than 20% of the
certiorari cases considered during the period 1945-54 (including petitions for certiorari in
forma pauperis), the number of certiorari petitions has not shown an appreciable decline.
Nor did a denial rate of at least 95% result in a decrease in the number of petitions for
certiorari in forma pauperis. Din. AD N. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 149-50 (1955).
35. Courts can mitigate the delaying effects of appeal by several means other than
denial of review. Thus, a policy of promptly transferring the papers ten days after the
transfer is granted will limit the time for filing notice of appeal. See note 28 supra.
Furthermore, a policy of dealing with frivolous appeals on motion to dismiss will consider-
ably expedite their disposition. See note 32 supra. Frivolous appeals can be further dis-
couraged by the imposition of damages on the party wasting the time and money of the
public and the appellee. While damages for frivolous appeals are not common, they are
authorized by law and approved by the cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1952) ; Slaker v. O'Con-
nor, 278 U.S. 188 (1929) ($150 plus costs) ; In re Midland United Co., 141 F.2d 692 (3d
Cir. 1944) ($1,000 to appellees for counsel fees) ; see Mason v. Summer Lake Irrigation
Dist., 216 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 937 (1955) (penalty not imposed
because section had fallen into disuse, but warning served for future cases). See also
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1952) (counsel may be personally liable for statutory costs arising from
his multiplication of the proceedings).
36. While 1404(a) is silent as to when the motion should be made, the conditions
requiring transfer would ordinarily be known early in the action, and failure to move at
that time might well be regarded as requiring denial of the eventual motion in the interest
of justice. Adler v. McKee, 92 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Nagle v. Pehnsylvania
R.R., 89 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
If appeal as of right were allowed, a party not really inconvenienced might be tempted
to make a transfer motion late in the proceeding in order to gain the benefit of the in-
creased delay. An appeal from the denial of such a groundless motion would be particularly
subject to a motion to dismiss for failure to present a substantial question. See note 32
supra. If a more certain solution to the problem of timing transfer motions is desired, the
statute or the Federal Rules might be amended to allow untimely motions only by leave
of the court. See Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. REv. 908, 938-
39 (1947).
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Appeal of an order determining a transfer motion would bar neither com-
pletion of the pleadings and discovery, nor consideration of pre-trial motions
not requiring the presence of witnesses whose convenience is in issue, nor even
entry of the action on the trial docket in the original district.8 7 In cases in-
37. Conceptually, an order final under Cohen is not issued in the main cause of action
but in a separate collateral action. Therefore, stay operates only to halt further steps in
the collateral action, and not, except where the collateral and main actions coincide, in the
main action. The conceptual problem raised by the notion that removing the record from
the district court leaves it without jurisdiction during the appeal can thus be answered by
the equally conceptual argument that the collateral action has its own record and that only
this record is removed by the appeal. Cf. Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg.
Co., 178 F.2d 866, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Crick, sunpra note 17, at 541-44.
1 A somewhat analogous situation exists when an appeal is taken from an interlocutory
order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1952). Such an appeal brings before the reviewing court
as much of the record as is required for considering the merits of the interlocutory order,
Ex parte National Enameling & Stamping Co., 201 U.S. 156 (1906), but leaves the court
below with jurisdiction to continue its proceedings in the action, Foote v. Parsons Non-
Skid Co., 196 Fed. 951 (6th Cir. 1912) (case may be settled in court below while inter-
locutory appeal is pending) ; Sutherland Paper Co. v. Michigan Carton Co., 14 F.2d 700
(E.D. Mich. 1926) (dictum; bill may be amended during pendency of interlocutory appeal).
In these cases, a stay is not a matter of right-though the appeal is. This factor does not
affect the theoretical question whether the same action can be before two courts at the same
time. Ex parte National Enameling & Stamping Co., supra at 161 (then existing law on
issuance of stay) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 62(a) (present rule on stay of interlocutory orders).
See also Note, 65 YALE L.J. 708, 709 (1956).
On a more realistic level, neither protection of the appellant nor preservation of the
appellate court's jurisdiction requires the stay of those proceedings not called into question
by the order. For example, a party will not be seriously injured by being required to
take depositions for discovery pending appeal since depositions can be taken in any dis-
trict, and, at least at the discovery stage, his expenses in this regard would not be sub-
stantially increased. Moreover, a decision by the district court disposing of the principal
action on motion would not oust the court of appeals of its jurisdiction; it would merely
avoid an unnecessary appellate decision.
More generally, the lower court is allowed to continue its proceedings while inter-
locutory appeals are being considered. A similar rule should govern 1404(a) orders since
the basic consideration justifying appeal in either case is the prevention of irreparable
injury. Cf. 6 MooRE 1 54.13, at 135.
Not all pre-trial activities could be accomplished pending review. Motions requiring
the presence of witnesses or parties for whose convenience the transfer was sought would
have to be delayed. In addition, time would have to be allowed for the taking of depositions
to be used in lieu of the appearance of witnesses who would have testified had the result
on appeal been different.
The Federal Rules allow district courts to establish their own procedures for docketing
actions on the trial calendar. FED. R. Civ. P. 40. In some districts, an action is auto-
matically docketed when the pleadings are completed. E.g., D. MAss. RULE 11. In others,
a motion by a party is required to docket an action. E.g., D. CoNS. RULE 7. Under either
of these rules, a stay would neither require removal of an action already docketed nor
prevent docketing when issue is joined. But rules requiring the action to be ready for trial
before docketing might require amendment to accommodate 1404(a) cases. E.g., E.D.
N.Y. RULE 1 (b). In any event, actions transferred after appeal would have to go to the
bottom of the docket in the transferee district.
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volving lengthy preliminaries, review would therefore cause virtually no delay.38
Indeed, when reversal results in trial in a district with a less crowded docket,
review might effect a more expeditious determination.39 More important, the
possibility of abuse should not jeopardize substantial rights of parties. To the
extent place of trial is in fact a matter of major importance, appeal, even if
time consuming, should be allowed.
By refusing to regard transfer orders as final and introducing the extraneous
issues involved in mandamus, courts have obscured the basic question whether
the litigants' interest in the place of trial warrants immediate review. Under
current federal practice, appeal as of right is the normal form of first-instance
38. The question here is one of fact will the appeal be disposed of before all the other
pre-trial procedures are complete. While the answer depends greatly on the particular
case, the figures below, showing the median time from issue to trial in the district courts
of each circuit and the median time from the filing of a notice of appeal to its disposition,
indicate that not infrequently the appeal would be determined before the action was ready
for trial.
Median time (in months) from issue to trial in the district courts, and
from filing of notice of appeal to disposition of the appeal in the courts
of appeals, during fiscal year ending June 30, 1955:
(1) (2) (3)
Circuit District Court Circuit Court Difference
from issue from iwtice (2)-(l)
to trial of appeal to
determination
All circuits 9.1* 9.0** -0.1
1st 14.5 6.4 -8.1
2d 25.4 8.0 -17.4
3d 21.9 6.3 -15.6
4th 8.0 4.8 -3.2
5th 5.9 10.0 +4.1
6th 8.7 11.8 +3.1
7th 11.3 8.2 -3.1
8th 7.0 7.9 +0.9
9th 8.0 17.2 +9.2
10th 6.3 8.1. +1.8
* excluding District of Columbia Circuit
** including District of Columbia Circuit
DIR. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 159, 182-86 (1955).
39. Length of the trial calendars is one factor that might be considered in determin-
ing the convenience of the parties and the interests of justice, even though the court is
barred from considering its own convenience. Fannin v. Jones, 229 F.2d 368 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 938 (1956).
If the figures given in note 38 supra are assumed to represent actual times, an action
which, after reversal, was transferred from the First Circuit to the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,
Ninth, or Tenth Circuit would come to trial sooner than if the transfer order had not been
appealed and reversed. A similar saving would result when an order granting a transfer
to a district in the Second or Third Circuit was reversed. Of course, if an order granting
a transfer is affirmed, the time consumed by the appeal adds to the total time required to
reach a decision on the merits of the case.
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review. 40 Mandamus is reserved for extraordinary cases, not broad classes of
orders. 41 Arguments might be made for replacing appeal as of right with dis-
cretionary review in all cases, or for introducing such review into broad areas
of the law.42 Changes as fundamental as these should be for Congress to con-
sider and not for the courts to attempt while deciding the narrow issue of
1404(a) review. So viewed, courts refusing mandamus to avoid establishing
precedent for general discretionary review appear justified. In any event, since
the Cohen definition of finality encompasses 1404(a) orders, the Supreme
Court, which must sooner or later resolve the conflict among the circuits, can
grant immediate review without altering the structure of the judicial system.
40. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (1952) (providing appeal as of right from final orders
and certain interlocutory orders).
41. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1947) ; Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n,
319 U.S. 21 (1943) ; see notes 15, 17 supra. But see 6 MooRE ff 54.10[2], at 71-74.
,Mandamus has been held to lie for review of any order denying a jury trial. Ex parte
Simons, 247 U.S. 231 (1918) ; Goldblatt v. Inch, 203 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1953). The basis
of this holding is unclear. It may constitute an exception to the extraordinary case theory
or embody the concept that jury trial occupies so high a place in the scale of judicial values
that any denial is extraordinary.
42. See, e.g., JuD. CoNF. U.S. AxN. REP. 27 (1953) (recommending amendment of
the Judicial Code to allow appeal of otherwise unappealable orders at the discretion of a
court of appeals, upon certification by the district judge).
